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Government Regulation and
Medium-Sized Business
Murray Weidenbaum
The rapid growth of government regulation
of business in the United States has generated
widespread concern over its costs and impacts.
However, virtually all the attention has focused
on either very large enterprises or very small
businesses. A substantial database is readily
available to the researcher in the case of the
larger companies. As a result, most of the professional writing on regulation examines the
subject from the viewpoint of the large enterprise. Simultaneously, a combination of political pressures and equity concerns has resulted
in numerous legislative provisions that exempt
small firms from regulatory requirements or
reduce their burden of compliance.
As a result of these two developments, a
substantial middle sector of American business
is neglected in professional as well as public
policy discussions of regulatory matters. This
report examines government regulation from
the viewpoint of the entire array of American
companies, but with special attention to what is
the "overlooked middle" sector. Medium-sized
firms benefit relatively little from the economies of scale generated by larger units or from
the legislative protections provided to smaller
enterprises.

Murray Weidenbaum is chairman of the Center
for the Study of American Business at Washington University in St. Louis. This paper was presented at the FINOV A Policy Conference on
Mid-Sized Business in Phoenix, Arizona, on
March 1, 1996.
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An Overview of Government
Regulation
No regulatory agency has a mission to depress the economy or to raise the unemployment rate. However, many of their actions
have those undesirable effects. The barriers to
economic growth imposed by regulatory agencies are numerous and growing. Regulatory
costs are a hidden tax reducing the competitiveness of American business and the availability of employment in the United States.
The popular view of regulation is wrong. It
is not a contest between the "good guys"
(government and the consumer) and the "bad
guys" (business). The reality is that the consumer is at the receiving end of the benefits as
well as the costs generated by government
regulation.
Business is the middleman (or
woman).
The nature of regulation becomes apparent
when seen from the viewpoint of the average
company. For each box on its organizational
chart, there are one or more government agencies that are counterparts to that box: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and construction of new facilities, Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) and the
workplace, Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and human resource
policies, etc. The rules these alphabet soup
agencies enforce figure heavily in the company's internal decision making .
The impact of governmental rule makers is
in one predictable direction: to increase the
firm's overhead and operating costs, and to
reduce the resources available to perform its
major task of producing goods and services for
the consumer. Government regulation results
in the higher prices that consumers pay to
cover the cost of compliance. But that characteristic makes regulation especially attractive to
2

government officials. The costs do not show
up in the government's budget (and thus do not
have to be paid for by taxation). But citizensconsumers do pay those costs in the form of
higher prices.

Regulatory costs are a hidden tax reducing the competitiveness of American
business and the availability of
employment in the United States.

The EPA says that the cost of complying
with environmental regulations came to $130
billion in 1994. That is not a static figure .
Recently enacted legislation will add new costs
in terms of billions of dollars a year. When
researchers add in the costs of meeting the
rules promulgated by several dozen other
regulatory agencies ranging from the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) to the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, they
come up with an aggregate hidden tax of regulatory costs of $500 billion a year or more . If
Congress had to appropriate another $500 billion a year to cover those costs, it would not
approve so much regulation.
Going beyond the dollar signs, more subtle
and far more serious burdens result from the
tremendous amounts of regulations that are
promulgated. Central among these are the adverse effects on research and development,
productivity, and capital formation. According
to professor Dale Jorgenson of Harvard University, by the time that the Clean Air Act is
fully implemented in the year 2005, its impact
(combined with that of previous environmental
regulations) will reduce the nation's capital
3

stock by 4.3 percent, increase the cost of capital by 5.5 percent, and reduce real gross domestic product by more than 3 percent annually.1
Regulation also reduces the flow of innovation and the production of new and better products because so many government regulatory
agencies have the power, which they frequently
exercise, to decide whether or not a new product will go on the market at all. The major
obstacles to the development of a new biotechnology industry are not financial or technological. They are regulatory.

Table 1

Mid-Sized Companies' Biggest Challenges

Percent

Category

52

Government regulation
Health insurance
Turning a profit
Taxes
Capital needs
Controlling expenses
Poor economy

20
18
18
14
9
5

The Regulatory Burden on Middle-Sized
Companies
As noted at the outset of this report, a great
deal of regulatory legislation is so written as to
lighten the burden on very small firms. However well motivated, such actions inevitably
shift the focus of regulatory enforcement to
other companies. This situation creates special
difficulty for the medium-sized enterprises that
cannot afford to maintain specialized staffs to
deal with environmental, safety, workplace,
and other complex regulatory requirements.
One modest-sized company printing T-shirts
recently bemoaned the fact that the OSHA levied $2,250 in fines for such "serious" violations as using two-pronged plugs rather than
three-pronged ones. The owner noted that if he
had limited his payroll to ten people - his total
labor force came to 14 - he would have been
spared this random inspection aimed at the giants of the printing industry.
This adverse experience with government
regulation is hardly unique. A recent survey
by the accounting firm of Arthur Andersen reported that, by far, the biggest challenge facing
mid-sized firms was government regulation.
Over half of the companies listed regulations as
the primary hurdle compared to only 18 per-
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Source: Arthur Andersen and Co.
cent which thought that "turning a profit" was
the main problem (see Table 1 above).
The presence of economies of scale in
complying with government regulation is clear.
The Fonune 500 fill o"ut pretty much the same
forms and meet the same requirements as
smaller firms. The result is that the cost of
complying with regulation is a higher percent
of sales for the medium-size company than for
larger enterprises. A survey of the cost of
compliance with OSHA rules for different sizes
of U.S. manufacturers showed very large
vanatwns. Companies with 2,000 to 5,000
employees reported an average cost of $237 per
worker, while companies with 500 to 1,000
employees had to pay almost twice as much an average cost of compliance of $467 per
worker.
An earlier study of the legal costs to employers for a National Labor Relations Board
election reported that companies with 100 to
149 employees spent $19 per employee eligible
to vote, more than double the amount ($8) paid
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by companies with 1,000 or more eligible
workers.
Professor Thomas Hopkins of the Rochester
Institute of Technology has prepared estimates
of the burdens of complying with federal regulation for different sizes of business (see Table
2). For companies with 20-499 employees, the
regulatory burden per employee avera~es
$5,195 - 78 percent higher than for compames
with more than 500 employees. Very small
companies (those with fewer than 20 workers)
have the highest unit compliance costs - 4
percent more than mid-sized companies. However, this small percentage difference is well
within the likely margin of error in these estimates.
A 1994 survey of mid-sized manufacturers
in the United States reported that environmental
regulations are the most burdensome regulations that they face. In answer to the question,
"Which one area of government regulation
would you describe as most burdensome?" 37
percent responded "environmental." In comparison, only 16 percent identified tax regulations, 15 percent work-place health and safety,
and 4 percent product liability.
Unfortunately, Congress has responded to
the issue of uneven distribution of regulatory
burdens in the predictable manner. It has not
reduced the burden of regulation by streamlining the process. Rather, it has exempted different sizes of companies, based arbitrarily on
the different regulatory statutes it was writing.
There is a host of regulatory exemptions for
very small businesses. A facility with nine or
fewer full-time employees is not required to
follow the procedures for Toxic Chemical Release Reporting Under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. A
company with a federal contract (or subcontract) of $25,000 or less does not have to comply with the Drug-Free Workplace Act. A con-
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Table 2

Federal Regulatory Costs by Size of Firm
Average Costs per Employee
for Firms With
Type of
Regulation

l
)

1-19
Employees

20-499
Employees

500+
Employees

Environmental
Other social
Economic efficiency
Economic transfer
Process

$1.246
658
574
1,050
2,017

$1,194
630
550
890
1,931

$671
354
309
501
1,086

All federal regulation

$5,545

$5,195

$2,921

Source:

Thomas D. Hopkins, Profiles of Regulatory Costs, A Report to the U.S. Small
Business
Administration,
November
1995.

tractor (or sub-contractor) receiving a federal
contract of less than $10,000 does not have to
meet the requirements of the Rehabilitation
Act.
For all companies - even those not receiving a dime from the government - there is a
bewildering array of size cutoffs, exempting
some from one regulatory requirement or another. Companies with 14 or fewer employees
are exempt from the Americans With Disabilities Act and from Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Employers with 19 or fewer
workers are exempt from the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and from the requirements of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985; the latter requires
employers to provide certain health insurance
benefits.
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Firms with 99 or fewer employees are not
covered by the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act. Companies with 99
or fewer participants in its employee benefit
plan to not have to file a report each year with
IRS by an independent qualified accountant.
There is a cluster of federal regulations that
take effect when the company hires its 50th
employee. These include the affirmative action
program for companies working on government
contracts, subcontracts, and grants and the
Family and Medical Leave Act. The primary
result usually escapes public attention because
it is less dramatic than the issue of cost but far
more fundamental: some small firms are reluctant to expand employment.
For example, WorldClass Process Inc., a
new and growing Pittsburgh processor of flatrolled steel coils, has increased its work force
to 49. According to the company's chief financial officer, "We're going to keep at 49 as
long as we can," to avoid crossing the 50employee threshold for the Family Leave Act. 2
Similarly, the Schonstedt Instrument Company of Reston, Virginia, a profitable, hightech firm, deliberately keeps its work force
below 50 employees. It does so to avoid having to file Form EE0-1 every year. The company's president makes the point effectively,
although not in scholarly fashion:
. . . a friend went over 50 employees on a
government contract. He gave me his
EEO file. . . it weighs more than 8
pounds . . . I have kept my employment
under 50. 3
U.S. firms do not entirely escape this problem when they establish overseas operations.
In Germany, companies with 10 or more employees must set up works councils, while in
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Belgium the cutoff is 50 and in France it is
100.
The most satisfying answer to this situation
is not to raise the exemption ceiling now contained in many regulatory statutes. Rather,
public policy should reduce the proliferation
and burden of regulation on all companies and thus obviate the need for special exemptions to a lucky few. This important objective
does not require dismantling the regulatory apparatus. It does mean developing more sensible and effective ways of responding to the
public's genuine concern for a cleaner environment, a safer work place, and other social
concerns.
Alternative Approaches to Regulatory
Reform
What can be done to reform government
regulation? At the outset, the reader should be
aware of the fact that command-and-control
directives by governments have an ancient
pedigree. In the Old Testament, the Book of
Deuteronomy commands, "Thou shall not lend
The ancient
upon usury to thy brother."
Babylonian Code of Hammurabi established
uniform weights and measures and limited the
rate of interest.
In contrast, most modern economists would
rely primarily on competition in the marketplace to protect the consumer. Deregulation of
interstate trucking, for example, has resulted in
thousands of new businesses entering the market. The heightened degree of competition has
forced sizable reductions in the cost of trucking
which ultimately shows up in lower prices of
all the items that move by truck.
When government does regulate (as in the
case of environmental pollution), economists
prefer that government policymakers make the
maximum use of economic incentives. Thus,
to an economist the environmental pollution
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problem is not the negative task of punishing
wrongdoers. Rather, the challenge is a very
positive one: to change people's incentives.
After all , people do not pollute because they
enjoy messing up the environment. They pollute because it often is cheaper or easier than
not polluting.
The basic economic approach is that the
price of a product should reflect its burden on
the environment. If prices of goods and services were increased to reflect the costs imposed
on the environment (perhaps as measured by
cleanup costs), consumers would buy less of
those environmentally damaging products. The
idea is to get polluters to change their ways as
high-polluting products become less attractive
to consumers than low-polluting products.

such analyses have been attacked by both ends
of the political spectrum. The far left does not
like using economic analysis because not every
proposal for government intervention passes a
benefit-cost test. The far right does not like it
either, because benefit-cost analysis can be
used to justify government intervention.
Benefit-cost tests compensate for the fact
that government decision makers do not face
economic constraints. If the costs to society of
a governmental regulation exceed the benefits,
that situation does not have an adverse impact
on the agency . The administrators may not
even know about it.

If the costs to society of a governmental
Public policy should reduce the proliferation and burden of regulation on all
companies - and thus obviate the need for
special exemptions to a lucky few.

regulation exceed the benefits, that
situation does not have an adverse
impact on the agency.

A study of the Delaware estuary showed
that effluent fees, set at a high enough level to
achieve the desired level of water purity, would
cost only one-half as much as a conventional
regulatory program to achieve the same environmental cleanup.
What about the existing array of commandand-control regulation? Here, economists offer
the notion of benefit-cost analysis to make sure
that any given regulation does more good than
harm. Benefit-cost analysis has been used for
decades in examining government spending
programs. It is neither a revolutionary, new
idea nor an invention of the far right. In fact,

Under the traditional approach they can
crow about the benefits and ignore the costs because the costs are transmitted to the consumer, not by the government but by business.
In fact, regulatory activists can enjoy needling
business about price increases, even when they
result from the costs of complying with the
very regulations that the activists had urged be
adopted . To an economist, "overregulation" is
not an emotional term. It is merely shorthand
for governmental rules for which the costs to
the public are greater than the benefits.
In cases where dollars are an inappropriate
measure of government regulation's impact,
there still may be opportunity for analysis in
the decision-making process. For example , the
drug that cures Rocky Mountain spotted fever
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also causes fatal anemia in one out of every
10,000 people who use it. A simple-minded
approach would prohibit the use of this
"dangerous" drug. Yet, the fever itself kills
about eight out of every 10 people who contract
the disease. Thus, the benefits of the drug
greatly outweighs the costs - measured, not in
dollar terms, but in human lives.
Critics who are offended by the notion of
subjecting regulation to a benefit-cost test unwittingly expose the weakness of their position.
They must fear that their pet rules would flunk
the test. After all, showing that a regulatory
activity generates an excess of benefits is a
strong justification for continuing it. The painful knowledge that resources available to safeguard human lives are limited concerns
economists when they see wasteful use of those
resources because of regulation.

Notes
1.
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1991, pp. 1-2.
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Brent Bowers, "Regulation Play," Wall Street
Journal, October 15, 1993, p. R16.
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E.O. Schonstedt, "'Robber Reg' Has Backfired," Letter to the Editor, Washington Times,
February 16, 1992, p. B5.

Conclusion
Now is an especially propitious time for
Congress to embark upon significant reform
and reduction of regulation. Such action would
both respond to the widespread citizen dissatisfaction with government and improve the lot of
the overlooked middle-sized company .
Government decision makers neglect an important fact when they adopt new or expanded
regulatory requirements:
government intervention often does more harm than good. Policymakers should not ignore the tremendous
ability of individuals and private organizations
to deal with the shortcomings that inevitably
arise in a modern economy.
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